(Augustinus 35 (1990), 279-297)
No one has ever questioned the genius of St. Augustine’s thought. Some, however, maintain that he was not immune to a touch of pessimism, especially with regard to human sexuality, and that the later influence of Augustine – proportionate to his genius – would have marked the doctrine of the Church, to this day, with a defective and negative sexual ethic. Such a judgment – in my opinion – is not fair either to St. Augustine or to Catholic doctrine on sexual morality.
As happens with every man, the experiences of his life left their mark on the thought of St. Augustine: but in the Manicheism of his early period we must see a dark shadow from which he had freed himself, and not a permanent source of pessimism (cf. Schmitt, E., Le mariage chrétien dans l’oeuvre de Saint Augustin, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris, 1983, pp. 107ff). Since he began to walk in the light of Faith, his vision of reality was constantly gaining in acuity and depth, as a consequence of his efforts – in the midst of innumerable controversies – to establish the truth in a balance between two extremes: Manicheism, on the one hand, and Pelagianism, on the other.
The Manichean Attack on Procreative Marriage
A first accusation against the Augustinian doctrine on marriage is that it focused only on its procreative dimension, to the exclusion of other aspects.
It is evident that for Augustine marriage is fundamentally a procreative partnership. It is easier to understand this emphasis if we remember the Manichean principles with which he had to fight. Since the body, in the dualistic vision of the Manichaeans, is the work of the devil, the propagation of the body is evil; and marriage, as a means of procreation, is also an evil. At the same time, sexual activity, con tal de evitar la concepción, is of little importance [1], since it affects only the body and not the spirit.
To the Manichaean position that marriage is bad because procreation is bad, the Bishop of Hippo offers the opposite thesis: it is precisely the goodness of procreation that makes marriage good [2]. This explains his insistence on the generative purpose of sexuality (cf. Covi, D.: “The end of sexual activity according to St. Augustine” Augustinus 17 (1972), p. 58).
In any case, even when St. Augustine’s defense of marriage focuses on its procreative purpose, it is inaccurate to think that he does not understand, according to the modern expression, the “personalistic” character of the marital relationship. Already in his treatise on Continence, we find an energetic defense of the goodness of sexual differences and the union of husband and wife (De cont. c. 9, no. 23 (PL 40, 364-365)). Especially important in this sense is the work “De bono coniugali”, which he wrote to refute the accusation of Manicheism that Jovinian had leveled against Catholics. In the first chapter he clearly explains the basis on which he wishes to establish the goodness of marriage: the sociable condition of human nature and the bond of solidarity of friendship between men. Only after having clarified that human sociability finds its first natural expression precisely in the conjugal society, does he indicate what distinguishes the marital relationship: it unites man and woman not with mere friendship, but in a procreative partnership [3].
In other passages of the same work – always within the idea that marriage is fundamentally oriented towards procreation – there are clear features of what can be called a personalist analysis of the marital union. Augustine explicitly states that there are other purposes in marriage, apart from procreation, from which its goodness derives. “One can reasonably ask – he writes – why marriage is good. It seems to me that it does not lie in the sole procreation of children, but also in the natural society constituted by both sexes” (“bonum coniugii… cur sit bonum merito quaeritur: Quod mihi non videtur propter solam filiorum procreationem, sed propter ipsam etiam naturalem in diverso sexu societatem” De bono coniug., c. 3, no. 3 (PL 40, 375)). And he describes mutual fidelity as “the first society of men in this visible and perishable world” (@@MASK0@@ c. 6, n. 6 (PL 40, 377)). He insists on the value of love between husband and wife, and how “ordo caritatis” unites even those whom age or luck may have deprived of children: “In the true and optimal marriage, despite the years, and although between man and woman the ardor of youth has faded, the order of charity remains in full force, between husband and wife” (@@MASK2@@ c. 3, n. 3 (PL 40, 375)). Presents fidelity as an exchange of mutual respect and service (“fides honoris et Regalorum invicem debitorum” ibid), and also insists that “the bodies of the spouses are holy when they keep faith with each other and with God” (“Sancta sunt ergo etiam corpora coniugatorum, fidem sibi et Domino servantium” c. 11, n. 13 (Pl 40, 382)). And, in her later treatise on widowhood, she states: “The good of marriage is always a good thing. Once, among the people of God, it was obedience to the law, while now it is a remedy for weakness, and, for some, a consolation of human nature” (“Nuptiarum igitur bonum semper est quidem bonum; sed in populo Dei fuit aliquando legis obsequium; nunc est infirmitatis remedium, in quibusdam vero humanitatis solatium” De bono vid., c. 8, no. 11 (PL 40, 437)).
The “bona” of Marriage
As can be seen from these passages, St. Augustine is aware not only of the procreative order of marriage, but also of its unitive value. Now, in my opinion, the Augustinian doctrine of matrimonial “bona” - “proles”, “fides”, “sacramentum” [4] – must be analyzed not only in a merely institutional context (as is usually done), but precisely also in personalist terms.
In 1500 years, his penetrating analysis of the “bona” has not lost relevance (cf. Pereira, B. Alves,: La doctrine du mariage selon saint Augustin, Paris, 1930; Reuter, A., Sancti Aurelii Augustini doctrina de bonis matrimonii, Romae, 1942). St. Augustine is not responsible for the fact that these were subsequently inserted into (and appropriated by) a somewhat narrow canonical and institutional understanding of marriage, which placed special emphasis on the aspect of obligación that each “bonum” entails, and was mainly interested in the legal consequences of its exclusión. It seems undoubtable to me that this concern about the obligatory nature of the “bona” has contributed to obscuring its real bondad. St. Augustine does not present the “bona” primarily as obligations, but as values, as blessings. “May these nuptial blessings be objects of love: offspring, fidelity, the unbreakable bond….. May those who want to praise nuptials, praise these nuptial blessings” (“In nuptiis tamen bona nuptialia diligantur, proles, fides, sacramentum… Haec bona nuptialia laudet in nuptiis, qui laudare vult nuptias” De nupt. et conc. I, c. 17, no. 19 (PL 44, 424-425); cf. c. 21, no. 23). For him, each of the essential properties of conjugal partnership – exclusivity, permanence, procreativity – is a good that confers dignity on marriage and demonstrates how deeply it responds to the innate aspirations of human nature, which can therefore boast of this goodness: “This is the good from which marriage derives its glory: offspring, chaste fidelity, the unbreakable bond” (“illud esse nuptiarum bonum unde gloriantur nuptiae, id est, proles, pudicitia, sacramentum” De pecc. orig., c. 37, no. 42 (PL 44, 406)).
The goodness and value of faithfulness is obvious. “You are unique to me”: is the first truly personalized affirmation of conjugal love, which is an echo of the words that God addresses to each man, through the prophet Isaiah: “Meus es tu!” – “You are mine” (Is. 43, 1). The goodness and value of the indissoluble bond is also clear: having a stable home and shelter; knowing that mutual belonging has to last a lifetime. All this is natural and highly attractive to the human person; He knows that it will require sacrifice, but at the same time he feels that that effort is worth it. “It is natural for the human heart to accept demands, even when they are difficult, for love of an ideal, and above all for love of a person” (John Paul II, General Audience, April 28, 1982. cf. Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II, V, 1 (1982), p. 1344). There is, in short, a natural value, a truly personalistic good, in the union that, due to its fecundity, is capable of satisfying the natural desire for self-perpetuation, and the perpetuation of conjugal love, in the offspring (cf. the author’s presentation: “The Goodness of the Bonum Prolis” (presented during the “Princeton University Symposium on Humanae Vitae“: 7-12, August 1988), in International Review, vol. XII, no. 3 (1988), pp. 181ff).
Seen from this perspective, the Augustinian doctrine of the three “bona” turns out to be truly personalistic. If we have largely lost this very positive awareness of the fundamental values of marriage, if we tend too easily to consider the burdensome, and not the good and attractive, of the exclusive, permanent and fruitful union between man and woman, it is to us, and not to St. Augustine, that a possible pessimism must be attributed.
The Pelagian Exaltation of Sexuality
St. Augustine’s writings on sexuality and marriage were directed not only against the negative opinions of the Manichaeans, but also against the overly optimistic ones of the Pelagians. In discussing his anti-Pelagian works, it is no less important to take into account the nature and terms of a controversy in which St. Augustine proposed to defend a Christian understanding of sexual morality against a naturalistic exaltation.
What interests us most, in his controversy with the Pelagians, is the nature of concupiscencia. The Pelagians maintained that this is a natural good (Contra Jul. Pel. IV, c. 21 (PL 45, 1348)), and that only its excesses are bad (De nupt. et conc. II, c. 19, no. 34 (PL 44, 456)). St. Augustine maintains that it is in itself a disease or disorder (cf. De nupt. et conc. II, c. 32, no. 55 (PL 44, 469); Contra Jul. Pel. V, c. 39 (PL 44, 807)) that accompanies man as a consequence of original sin.
Augustine considers the imperfections of man, in his current state, in light of his first creation and his eternal destiny. At this point in his doctrine – and it is important to remember this – he follows in the footsteps of Saint Paul who, in his letter to the Romans, had complained so vividly about concupiscence, the fruit of sin, which kept him captive, and who so expressively expressed his desire to be freed from the law of sin that dwelt in his members (Rom. 7:8, 23-24; cf. Gal. 5:17).
There is nothing Manichean in St. Augustine’s attitude towards the body, but he does not ignore that “our body burdens the soul” [5] and, also like Saint Paul, he longs for liberation. He is aware, in a particular way, that sexuality is disordered in relation to its original plan, and he longs for that situation in Paradise where sexual appetite was not subject to libido [6], and marital relations would have been possible without instinct dominating the mind, will and love.
Like Paul, Augustine was not a man to mince his words. Perhaps that is why it is easy to take some of his statements about concupiscence out of context. This is precisely what the Pelagian bishop Julian of Eclanum did, who in some way deserves our gratitude because the result was the work of St. Augustine, “De nuptiis et concupiscentiis”, where the Saint’s eagerness to clarify many more delicate aspects of his thought makes it easier for us to grasp it with greater precision.
Augustine and Sexual Pleasure
Julian had misrepresented Augustine’s censure of concupiscence as implying a negative judgment about the attraction between the sexes, or about the sexual pleasure experienced in the marital relationship. Augustine vigorously rejects the accusation that he had condemned sexual differences, their union or their fertility: “He asks us whether it is the differences between the sexes, or their union, or their very fertility, that we attribute to the devil. We answer that none of these qualities, since sexual differentiation corresponds to the bodies of the parents, while the union between them corresponds to the procreation of children, and its fruit to the blessing granted to the institution of marriage. But todas estas realidades son de Dios…..” (“Vides igitur quemadmodum nos interroget… utrum diversitatem sexuum dicamus ad diabolum pertinere, an commixtionem, an ipsam fecunditatem. Respondemus itaque, nihil horum; quia et diversitas sexuum pertinet ad vasa gignentium, et utriusque commixtio ad seminationem pertinet filiorum, et ipsa fecunditas ad benedictionem pertinet nuptiarum. Haec autem omnia ex Deo…” De nupt. et conc., II, c. 5. (PL 44, 444)). And later he repeats that he has nothing to object to Julian’s praise (through which he would like to win over less mature spirits) “of the works of God; namely, his praise of human nature, of semen, of marriage, of the union of the sexes, and of their fruits: because todas estas obras son buenas” (“insinuare se nititur cordibus parum intelligentium, laude operum divinorum, hoc est, laude naturae humanae, laude seminis, laude nuptiarum, laude utriusque sexus commixtionis, laude fecunditatis: quae omnia bona sunt” De nupt. et conc. II, c. 26, no. 42 (PL 44, 460)). When Augustine condemns concupiscence, therefore, he does not condemn any of these God-given values of sexuality. Now, there is another point that is interesting to note. St. Augustine makes it clear that what he considers the disorder of concupiscence cannot be identified with the placer sexual.
It is worth placing special emphasis on this point, since, in view of the vigor with which Augustine criticizes those who allow themselves to be carried away by concupiscence, a superficial reader could conclude that he is criticizing the search for pleasure in the marital union. A more careful reading shows that this is not the case.
In a passage from “De bono coniugali” in which he compares nutrition and generation, he had insisted that sexual pleasure, temperately and rationally sought, is not and cannot be concupiscence [7]. Elsewhere, he opposes the licit pleasure of the conjugal embrace with the illicit pleasure of fornication [8]. In his controversy with Julián, he clarifies that it is not pleasure that he criticizes, “since pleasure can also be honest” (“quia potest voluptas et honesta esse…” De nupt. et conc. II, c. 9, no. 21 (PL 44, 448)). Furthermore, he declares himself happy that Julián admits that pleasure can be both licit and illicit [9].
There is a passage of special interest that shows the methodical way in which he responds to his adversary, without allowing him to attribute statements to him that he has not made or positions that he does not hold. It agrees with Julian’s enumeration of the aspects of the sexual relationship that, being part of divine creation, deserve praise; but he is not willing to concede more. When Julián affirms – as if Augustine had denied it – that conjugal sexual intercourse, with its aspects of intimacy, of placer, and semination, are from God and are to be praised, Augustine points out these “arguments” – dixit “cum calore”; dixit “cum voluptate“; dixit “cum semine” – which are irrelevant, since Augustine fully agrees that these are good realities given by God. But – he adds – Julian, in affirming all this (trying to make points that I have never doubted), does not mention precisely what I say is bad in that marital relationship: carnal concupiscence or libido [10].
Before considering more carefully what St. Augustine means by carnal concupiscence, it is worth recalling the main points we have established so far. The essential goods of marriage – children, fidelity, the unbreakable bond – are vigorously defended by St. Augustine, who presents them as blessings of the marital state. He also insists on the goodness of sexual differences, and the intimacy and pleasure of marital copulation: all realities given by God. The disorder he wants to point out is found in the sensitive appetite (which is also good in itself (Op. imperf. c. Jul. IV, c. 29 (PL 45, 1353))), and is particularly noticeable in the field of sexuality. His reservations, therefore, deal not with the goodness of marriage, but with the strength and effect of “libido” or “concupiscentia carnis” which, he affirms, “is not a good coming from the essence of marriage, but an evil, a consequence of original sin” (“Non est enim ex naturali connubio veniens bonum, sed ex antiquo peccato accidens malum” De nupt. et conc. I, c. 17, no. 19 (PL 44, 425)).
Concupiscence in Marriage
So, what is carnal concupiscence for St. Augustine if it is not the pleasure of sexual copulation (And if, therefore, it is not the desire racional of pleasure)? It is that “disobedience of the flesh”, by which the human will “has even lost the empire that is its own over its own members” [11]: “that carnal appetite that forces man to seek sensations, for the pleasure they provide, both when the spirit consents to it and when it opposes it” (“Libido autem sentiendi est, de qua nunc agimus, quae nos ad sentiendum, sive consentientes mente, sive repugnantes, appetitu carnalis voluptatis impellit” Contra Iul. Pel. IV, c. 14, no. 65 (PL 44, 770)). It is that disordered aspect of sexual desire that is separated from man’s will and the rational ordering of sexual appetite: that causes him to experience sexual desire at times when it is impossible or illicit to satisfy it; that confuses his moral sense, inspiring actions that his mind disapproves: behaviors that would have to be judged “non concupiscendo, sed intelligendo” (Op. imperf. c. Jul., IV, 69 (PL 45, 1379)). In a word, concupiscence is the devastating tendency to seek pleasure independently of reason or will [12].
Surely few would have confronted St. Augustine if he had been content to give, as examples of concupiscence, the phenomenon of fornication or adultery. But we cannot and do not want to remain silent about the fact that it speaks of concupiscence. dentro del matrimonio mismo, in the exercise of marital relations. One of the ideas he often repeats is that, even in the licit use of marriage, an evil is present, an evil that chaste spouses use well (cf. De nupt. et conc. II, c. 21, no. 36 (PL 44, 457); De pecc. orig. c. 37, no. 42 (PL 44, 406); De cont. c. 12, no. 27 (PL 40, 368); Contra Iul. Pel. V, c. 16, (PL 44, 819), etc. cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Suppl., q. 41, art. 3 ad 4).
For some, this single idea is enough to justify the claim that St. Augustine maintains a Manichaean position in relation to sexuality. However, I consider that it can be demonstrated not only that his thesis is genuinely Christian, but that it contains truths of great insight and usefulness for the guidance of both married and celibate people.
Part of St. Augustine’s argument is that no one is ashamed of what they are. totalmente bueno (“cum debeat neminem pudere quod bonum est” De nupt. et conc. II, c. 21, no. 36 (PL 44, 457)), and uses this point to demonstrate that algún element of disorder accompanies the marital act. He reasons that, even though it is convenient for everyone to carry out their honest actions in the light of day, this is not the case of the marital act that – being honest – the spouses tendrían vergüenza de realizar en público: “And how is this so, if not because that which by its nature is honest, is done in such a way that it is accompanied by shame derived from the penalty of sin?” (“Unde hoc, nisi quia sic geritur quod deceat ex natura, ut etiam quod pudeat comitetur ex poena?” De civ. Dei, XIV, c. 18 (PL 41, 427); cf. Contra duas Ep. Pelag. I, c. 16, no. 33 (PL 44, 565). Some less accurate expressions of Augustine when speaking of concupiscence, which seem to suggest that it implies a certain personal guilt, are corrected by Saint Thomas Aquinas, who clearly teaches that concupiscence remains in us as a defect (‘poena’) that accompanies our fallen state, and not as a moral fault (‘culpa’): “non est malum culpae, sed poena tantum, quae est inobedientia concupiscentiae ad rationem” (Suppl. q. 49, art 4 ad 2)).
How is it that spouses, who have no problem publicly expressing their mutual affection through a look or a smile, would be ashamed to perform the marital act in front of others, even – the example is also from St. Augustine – in front of their own children?
The explanation lies partly in the imperious nature of the sexual impulse, as a result of which an ambivalent element enters even into marital sexuality [13]. Ambiguity appears in the conjugal act itself: in the fact that what should be a total act of love can only be an act of selfishness: what should be the maximum physical expression of self-donation and dedication to the other – therefore full of delicacy – can be reduced to an act essentially focused on itself and determined to satisfy a powerful impulse towards mere physical pleasure.
Spouses who sincerely love each other have no difficulty in recognizing this element that – within their mutual relationship – calls for purification. They feel the need to moderate and restrain the force that attracts them, so that they can unite in an act that is one of true mutual donation and not of mere simultaneous conquest. They cannot therefore abandon themselves too lightly to intimacy, since in it they are put to the test, at least before their own eyes. It is natural and logical that they do not want to subject that test to the scrutiny of others.
It must also be taken into account that the sexual impulse, in addition to being imperious, tends to be indiscriminate; it easily disconnects from love, drawing the person in a direction that love cannot or should not follow. This could be the case, for example, of a celibate person who feels powerfully attracted to a friend’s husband or wife. Getting married does not eliminate these difficulties. A married person may also suddenly be tempted by a sexual desire – unsought and yet perhaps seemingly uncontrollable – towards a third party. Within the same married life, between husband and wife, desire can arise at a time when it cannot be satisfied, or it can drift in a direction that is not lawful to follow. The husband who loves his wife can sometimes find himself in this trance. He is aware that his wife does not want to have sexual relations, and yet he does; or, to put it more accurately, your instinct wants them. I would like to have the sexual tendency more subject to the will, to the control of reason; but he experiences that his instinct does not obey so easily. He must overcome him and make him submit. This difficulty, “this struggle between will and libido” (“hanc voluntatis et libidinis rixam” De civ. Dei XIV, c. 23, no. 3 (PL 41, 431)), this threatening presence – also within marriage – of sexual selfishness constitutes the evil of concupiscence that, according to St. Augustine, married people must learn to use well.
Conjugal Chastity
This disorder of concupiscence, which in our present state accompanies the good of marriage, is redeemed by the virtue of chastity. It is possible to condense St. Augustine’s thoughts in this regard in a single phrase, in which he distinguishes “the goodness of nuptials from the evil of carnal concupiscence, which conjugal chastity uses well” (“nuptiarum bonum a concupiscentiae carnalis malo, quo bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis” De nupt. et conc. II, Preface (PL 44, 435-436); cf. Op. imperf. c. Jul. Preface (PL 45, 1049)).
What marital chastity means to Augustine is clear from his comments on the story – from the book of Genesis – that tells us the behavior of Adam and Eve before and after the fall. Before, they were naked and yet they felt no shame (Gen. 2, 25): “not because they could not see, but because when they looked at their members they felt nothing to be ashamed of” (“non quia non videbant, sed quia nihil unde confunderentur in membris senserant, quae videbant” De nupt. et conc. I, c. 5, no. 6 (PL 44, 417)). In that state of whole nature, Adam and Eve experienced nothing disordered – no element of selfishness – in their marital attraction to each other. The occasions for having marital relations would have been determined not by mere instinct, but by his intelligence and will, and would have corresponded fully and connaturally to his own sense of mutual donation in the exercise of procreative power. “If no sin had preceded, man would have been generated by the organs of generation, no less obedient than the other members to a calm and orderly will” (“…si peccatum non praecessisset, tranquilae voluntati obedientibus sicut caetera membra genitalibus, seminaretur homo” De nupt. et conc. II, c. 7, no. 17 (PL 44, 446); cf. ibid. c. 22, no. 37; c. 31, no. 53).
St. Augustine highlights the reaction of our first parents when, after sinning, they discovered that sexual desire seemed to have become detached from conjugality: out of shame they made them cover their limbs, and they clothed themselves. It is important to note that, even though they were husband and wife and were alone, it was between the two – in their mutual relationship – that the shame was present. It was not shame of being husband and wife, nor was it shame of giving expression to their conjugal affection; It was about a new element that threatened the purity they had experienced in their original relationship.
As an effect of concupiscence, men and women become too absorbed by the physical aspects of sexuality and its external attraction. It is then more difficult to reach, “see” and understand the inner meaning, the true substance and authentic value of sexual differences and complementarity. Our first parents, in the state of primitive creation, had a deeper and fuller vision. Each was in a position to contemplate the other’s nakedness with calm joy, without sexual attraction or understanding – sexual enrichment – being disturbed by excessive bodily impact. The act of covering his nakedness after the fall was a natural reaction aimed at defending the clarity of his vision, his ability to contemplate mutual sexuality in fullness.
ud of its “nuptial” significance, without running the risk of being blinded by its physical aspect alone (cf. John Paul II, Audiencia General, January 2, 1980: Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II, III, 1 (1980), p. 11-15).
In the reaction of Adam and Eve, “pudicitia coniugalis” is discovered: a certain modesty or reserve between husband and wife born of their vigilance in the face of that which does not honor the mystery of their reciprocal sexuality and does not act in accordance with the laws that their reason discovers in them; a tendency that is a temptation to use, and not respect, the other. Adam and Eve give a first example of marital chastity, taking precautions to preserve their mutual love from the selfishness of that instinct “which does not readily obey the will even of chaste spouses” (“ita ut ipsis quoque pudicis ad nutum non obtemperet coniugatis” De nupt. et conc. II, c. 35, no. 59 (PL 44, 472)).
The action of Adam and Eve exemplifies that sense of shame which, given the current state of our nature, is now natural to all men [14]. Their action can also serve as a clear lesson: if married people do not observe a certain moderation in their marital relations, both the mutual respect that should characterize their love and the authentic freedom with which their reciprocal spousal donation should be carried out can be undermined [15].
Catholic Tradition and the Misuse of the Body
As is evident, chastity does not have its applications only in married life. If a parallel to the experience of Adam and Eve were sought, perhaps it could be found in that of a teenage couple in whom the first attraction of a completely idealistic love suddenly gives way to the awareness of the disturbing element of the flesh. It is necessary to recognize then that this new attraction is also natural, while at the same time discovering that it is not good in all its aspects. Just as couples preparing for marriage may have the conviction that not everything is good in the instinct that drags them so powerfully; and they can maintain this conviction even as they recognize the goodness of the union to which they are attracted. It is not bad to feel the attraction of that union; but it is not good to allow yourself to be dragged into it against your conscience.
Much of today’s “sex education” seems to want to convince young people that there is no good and bad use of sexuality, any use of the body being in fact indifferent. St. Augustine, with all the Catholic moral tradition, insists that es precisamente porque el cuerpo es bueno, que se puede hacer mal uso de él. Thus, in a typical passage, he compares the virtuous use of mal of ‘libido’ (that is, the orderly use of sexuality despite the disorder of concupiscence), on the part of married people, and the bad use of bien of the body by the impudent [16]. Concupiscence constantly threatens to dominate both the married and the single; It is necessary, as Augustine says, that “the chaste dominate it” (“… de libidine imperiosa impudicis, domanda pudicis” De nupt. et conc. II, c. 35, no. 59 (PL 44, 471). Saint Thomas Aquinas teaches that continence “importat resistentiam rationis ad concupiscentias pravas” (II-II, q. 155, art. 4)); chastity also being a gift from God (“…donum esse, et hoc a Deo” De bono vid. c. 4, no. 5 (PL 40, 433); cf. De nupt. et conc. I, c. 3, no. 3 (PL 44, 415)).
There is constant pressure on youth today to act as if immodesty, and not modesty, were natural; as if a man and a woman, or a boy and a girl, did not feel a natural reproach for certain ways of speaking, or dressing, or behaving; as if passion were never selfish and calculating, with the consequent obligation to judge it as such, and to resist it. All this leads, through a progressive dulling of the moral sense, to an unnatural and inhuman situation in which the prevailing atmosphere, between the sexes, is one of suspicion, suspicion or fear, where the lack of respect acts as a powerful inhibiting factor in the effective development and maturation of love.
The awareness that a selfish element is present in the field of sexuality is not the result of a certain religious training. On the contrary, it is natural that everyone is aware of this problem (cf. Thonnard, F.-J.: “La notion de concupiscence en philosophie augustinienne”, Recherches Augustiniennes 3 (1965), p. 95), just as it is natural for each one to be aware of that imbalance in their own nature that Christians have traditionally called original sin, and which causes “desires against which the faithful must also fight” (“operatur desideria, contra quae dimicant et fideles” Contra Jul. Pel. II, c. 3, no. 5). The Church is not pessimistic when it insists that we must fight against the evil tendencies of fallen nature; this is realism. It would be pessimism to say that it is not possible to win in the fight. The Church proclaims that we can be victorious: with Christ (“I can do all things through Him who comforts me” Fil. 4, 13), but not without Him. It would, however, be a form of Pelagianism to affirm that there is no battle in this field.
The faithful recognize without great difficulty the truths that underlie the doctrine of the Church. They would certainly prefer that there was no need to fight (“Nullus quippe sanctorum est, qui non velit facere ne caro adversus spiritum concupiscat” Op. imperf. contra Iul. VI, c. 14 (PL 45, 1531)); but, given the inevitability of battle, they appreciate positive guidance about this war that we must all fight, and about the spiritual means that are offered to us (prayer and the sacraments, in particular) to avoid being defeated in the fight, or to remedy the defeats that may occur, and thus ensure definitive victory.
Sexual Knowledge and Truth
Space does not allow more than a brief reference to another question that occupied St. Augustine (although from a clearly different angle than the one we present here): why Adam and Eve (as it seems) did not have sexual relations in Paradise (cf. Saint Thomas: Prima Pars, q. 98, art. 2 ad 2). It was only after the fall that – according to the biblical term – conocieron (cf. Gen. 4, 1). The term used in the Bible is highly expressive and could give rise to interesting reflections of a pastoral and ascetic nature.
Canon law places personal consent at the center of the constitution of the marital alliance, and insists that no human power can replace this consent (c. 1057 § 2). It does not seem necessary to postulate that divine power – the Will of God – would have replaced the human consent of Adam and Eve. It seems reasonable to suppose rather that they – upon realizing that they had been created by God to be husband and wife – accepted and joyfully ratified this divine choice. If in Paradise, however, no sexual intercourse took place between them, it was undoubtedly because they were not yet “ready for it”; They were, so to speak, still in the period of betrothal, in the process of getting to know each other as spouses; and marital copulation – insofar as it brings into play the fullness of self-donation, self-revelation, and marital knowledge – there would still not be tenido sentido [17].
The tendency towards sexual union when it “does not make sense” is the practical expression of carnal concupiscence, present in singles and married people. For those who are not united in marriage, copulation has no ningún meaning: they no pueden mutually become participants in the spousal knowledge that is implicit in copulation, which therefore becomes a meaningless act. In the case of husband and wife, copulation makes sense; but it has it fully only if the act constitutes a ratification of the procreative orientation of the marital relationship. That is why contraceptive marital sexual treatment is meaningless; “contradicts the truth of conjugal love” (John Paul II, Allocutio, September 17, 1983: Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II, VI, 2 (1983), p. 563), and is proof of the dominance of carnal lust. That is why marital copulation restricted to infertile periods, without sufficient cause, has poco meaning, while the restriction of copulation to those periods, with sufficient cause, tiene sense, and demonstrates the dominance of reason over instinct.
The Imperfection of Non-Procreative Conjugal Intercourse
What should be made of St. Augustine’s frequently expressed opinion that conjugal sexual intercourse is justified only if it is carried out with the intention that it be procreative, and that it has an element of imperfection or venial fault if it is carried out in the pursuit of pleasure alone [18]? Augustine is based on I Cor. 7, 5-7, where Saint Paul advises spouses not to abstain from marital relations for too long, and adds that this is said by “secundum veniam” (in the Vulgate it is read “secundam indulgentiam”). Since Paul is evidently talking about what can be done to them permitir To those who are married, it is possible, of course, to disagree with Augustine’s exegesis according to which he would be imputing to them a pecado. It seems to me that the difference in accent between Paul and Augustine, but at the same time the close connection between the thought of one and the other, is seen in the thesis that seeking copulation consciously disconnected from its procreative purpose is, for spouses, selfishness. excusable (Paul), but, with everything, egoísmo (Augustine), and, in this last sense, a lack venial.
Today it is undoubtedly difficult to defend this thesis, which seems to leave aside the “humanitatis solatium” aspect of marriage. Some would perhaps reject it on the grounds that it overlooks the unitive power and function of the marital act itself. It is worth stopping at this point.
Augustine, if he were alive today (and Aquinas, with him), would perhaps insist on the essential doctrine of Humanae Vitae – that the unitive and procreative aspects of the marital act are inseparable – and would invite us to ponder whether it can really be affirmed that copulation has a unitive meaning, “in itself”, that is, without reference to its procreative function. If the Humanae Vitae says that the two aspects or meanings of the act are inseparable, does it not imply that the exclusion of the procreative sense – even on a purely intentional level – frustrates the singular capacity of the act to express and effectuate the conjugal union? In human terms, the meaning of “you are my husband” is: “you are unique to me; and the proof of your uniqueness is in the fact that with you, and only you, I am willing to share my procreative power.” The unitive function and meaning of the marital act consists precisely in this compartir la procreatividad recíproca; no other element can be identified in the act that makes it truly expressive of the singularidad of the marital relationship [19].
If spouses do not consciously seek the unitive experience of sharing their complementary procreativity, what is it that they seek if not pleasure (divorced from meaning)? I am not saying that they are wrong to seek this pleasure; but I suggest that this sharing only of pleasure is a substitute imperfecto (and non-conjugal) of the truly unitive experience that involves open sexual treatment of life.
Marital chastity is necessarily based on the understanding and respect for the procreative orientation of the marital act. St. Augustine points out how concupiscence is tempered by “parentalis affectus.” “To the ardor of voluptuousness,” he says, “a certain gravity and profound meaning is added when man and woman consider that the marital union tends to make them father and mother” (“Intercedit enim quaedam gravitas fervidae voluptatis, cum in eo quod sibi vir et mulier adhaerescunt pater et mater esse meditantur” De bono coniug., chap. 3 (PL 40, 375). The “gravitas” of this passage clearly seems to refer also to the sentido depth of the act, especially if we consider that St. Augustine is talking about the spouses who meditan about the natural purpose of the act they perform). We see again that he does not say anything against pleasure, but he insists on how one should reflect on pleasure. sentido that underlies an act as pleasurable as copulation [20].
St. Augustine’s insistence that marital sexual intercourse is only rational if it is open to procreation may seem, at first glance, to neglect the personalistic factor of sexuality. A more careful analysis, however, should lead us to raise the question of whether there can be a true conjugal personalism that is anti-procreative; whether sexuality, deliberately separated from its procreative orientation, has a rational and personalistic conjugal meaning.
We are free to disagree with St. Augustine or Saint Thomas. However, one may wonder if there is not a tendency today to teach married people that there is nothing that needs to be moderated in their physical relationship, that they do not have to take into account that selfish element, within sexuality, that is capable of undermining their love for each other. An authentic pastoral service toward married people should logically help them reflect on that potential selfishness that may be present in their intimate relationships, and that tends to become more present to the extent that the marital act is deliberately separated from its procreative orientation. In the teaching of St. Augustine, conjugal chastity keeps husbands closer to “limes mali” (cf. Contra Jul. Pel. IV, c. 8, no. 49 (PL 44, 763)), the border of evil: if one goes beyond it, one enters the area of moral guilt.
In another article (“The Inviolability of the Conjugal Act”, loc. cit, pp. 163-164), I have suggested that it seems inappropriate to want to explain the pleasure of the conjugal act exclusively in terms of its procreative purpose. It seems logical to affirm that the abundance of pleasure in the act would correspond to the joyful sense of mutual conjugal surrender and possession. It is part of my argument, however, that these personalistic values, naturally present in the marital act, are destroyed if the act is deliberately denatured through contraception. If spouses allow pleasure to matter too much to them, they run the risk of taking before giving, and thus losing the sense of their mutual dedication. Marital chastity will help them give priority to truly personalistic values and keep them in mind: the reaffirmation, through the marital act, of their spousal relationship, which becomes alive in this sharing of a procreativity open to life. These higher goals express and maintain his good will. Then, as Augustine states, the good will of the spouses guides and ennobles the subsequent pleasure (which they seek and experience), but their good will does not allow itself to be dominated by that pleasure [21].
Neo-dualism?
Perhaps at the beginning of the 20th century Christians had to get rid of a certain puritanism in sexual matters (although it must be recognized that this was a peculiarly Protestant problem). That is obviously not the current problem. It is worth remembering, with this perspective, that St. Augustine first had to defend marriage and sexuality from the Manichean tendency to despise them; and later he had to protect them against the Pelagian tendency to treat them as if they did not contain any delicate or problematic element.
It seems that we have distanced ourselves from the semi-Manichean elements, present in Puritanism or Jansenism. Augustin’s position – firmly held in a happy medium (cf. De nupt. et conc. II, c. 3, no. 9 (PL 44, 441); Contra duas Ep. Pelag. II, c. 2, nos. 2-4 (PL 44, 572-573); Op. imperf. c. Jul. III, c. 177 (PL 45, 1321), etc) – can warn us, however, of the dangers coming from a neo-Pelagianism, which suggests that nothing is wrong, within sexuality, that nothing requires control in that field.
St. Augustine probably realized something that we would do well to ponder (cf. Op. imperf. c. Jul. VI, c. 14 (PL 45, 1529). The position that denies that sexuality presents a special difficulty may end up denying that it contains a particular goodness. If Pelagianism (or neo-Pelagianism) does not take into account the potential selfishness of the sexual instinct, then – despite its apparent exaltation of sexuality – it may end up provoking a quasi-Manichean reaction, which makes sex futile. There is no shortage of manifestations in this regard in the current devaluation of marriage and procreation. Sexuality, deprived of mystery and significance, of importance and difficulty, is being separated from both the order of reality and that of grace. It is being presented in an increasingly depersonalized and dehumanized light, as a merely bodily or physiological activity, in which man can participate without compromising his spirit. The dualism present in this position is deeply anti-human and anti-Christian.
Fountain: cormacburke.or.ke
NOTES
[1] “Aren’t you the ones who consider the procreation of children as something even more criminal than cohabitation itself?”: “nonne vos estis que filios gignere, eo quod animae ligentur in carne, gravius putatis esse peccatum quam ipsum concubitum?” De moribus Manich. c. 18, no. 65 (PL 32, 1372).
[2] “Non enim concubitum, sed ut longe ante ab Apostolo dictum est (I Tim. 4, 3), vere nuptias prohibetis, quae talis operis una esta honesta defensio” De moribus Manich. c. 18, no. 65 (PL 32, 1372). cf. Contra Faustum Manich., lib. 30, c. 6 (PL 42, 494).
[3] “Sociale quiddam est humana natura, magnumque habet et naturale bonum vim quoque amicitiae… Prima itaque naturalis humanae societatis copula vir et uxor est… Consequens est connexio societatis in filiis, qui unus honestus fructus est, non coniunctionis maris et feminae, sed concubitus. Poterat esse in utroque sexu, etiam sine tali commixtione… amicalis quaedam et germana coniunctio” De bono coniug., c. 1 (PL 40, 373).
[4] De bono con. c. 24, no. 32 (PL 40, 394); De nupt. et conc. I, c. 17, no. 19 (PL 44, 424); De Gen. ad litt., lib. IX, chap. 7, no. 12 (PL 34, 397); De pecc. orig., c. 34, no. 39 (PL 44, 404); De sancta virginitate, c. 12, no. 12 (PL 40, 401).
[5] commenting Rom. 7, 24: “Ubi quid intellecturi sumus, nisi quia corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam?” De nupt. et conc. I, c. 31, no. 35 (PL 44, 433).
[6] De nupt. et conc. I, c. 27, no. 30 (PL 44, 431); De civ. Dei XIV, c. 23, c. 24 (PL 41, 430sq); Contra Jul. Pel. III, c. 25, no. 57 (PL 44, 731-732); De Gen ad litt. IX, c. 10, no. 18 (PL 34, 399).
[7] “et utrumque non est sine delectatione carnali, quae tamen modificata, et temperantia refrenante in usum naturalem redacta, libido esse non potest” De bono con. c. 16, no. 18 (PL 40, 385).
[8] “Delectant coniugales amplexus: delectant etiam meretricum. Hoc licite, illud illicite.” Sermo 159, c. 2, no. 2 (PL 38, 868-869).
[9] “Satis est nobis, quod confitearis aliam esse illicitam, aliam licitam voluptatem. Ac per hoc mala est concupiscentia quae indifferenter utrumque appetit, nisi ab illicita voluptate licita voluptate frenetur” Contra Jul. Pel. VI, c. 16, no. 50 (PL 44, 852); cf. ib. IV, c. 2, no. 7 (PL 44, 739).
[10] “«Ista», inquit, «corporum commixtio, cum calore, cum voluptate, cum semine, a Deo facta, et pro suo moda laudabilis approbatur» … Dixit «cum calore»; dixit «cum voluptate»; dixit «cum semine»: non tamen dicere ausus est, Cum libidine: quare, nisi quia nominare erubescit, quam laudare non erubescit?” De nupt. et conc. II, c. 12, no. 25 (PL 44, 450).
[11] “…etiam in membra propria proprium perdidisset imperium” De nupt. et conc. I, c. 6, no. 7 (PL 44, 418); cf. De Gen. ad litt. IX, c. 10, 16ff (PL 34, 398).
[12] It seems more accurate to describe concupiscence as “a manque de contrôle de la raison et de la volonté sur les mouvements des organes sexuels” (Schmitt, E.: op. cit. p. 95), which simply as “the passionate, uncontrolled element in sexuality” (Bonner. G.: St Augustine of Hippo, Canterbury Press, 1986, p. 375). Man’s passions are part of his nature, also in their original state. The element that characterizes concupiscence is not passion, but the lack of control.
[13] That there is something that must be purified, in conjugal sexuality, is a truth expressly recalled by the Second Vatican Council when it speaks of how “the Lord has deigned to sanar this love” – also in its physical expressions – “to perfect and elevate it” (Gaudium et Spes, no. 49; cf. Familiaris Consortio, no. 3). Divine grace is necessary to heal the wounds of sexual concupiscence: cf. Thonnard, F.-J.: “La morale conjugale selon saint Augustin” Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 15 (1969), p. 131.
[14] “Hoc pudoris genus, haec erubescendi necessitas certe cum omni homine nascitur, et ipsis quodammodo naturae legibus imperatur, ut in hac re verecundentur etiam ipsa pudica coniugia” Contra Duas Ep. Pelag. I, c. 16, no. 33 (PL 44, 565).
[15] “… that interior freedom of the gift, which by its nature is explicitly spiritual and depends on the maturity of the inner man. This freedom presupposes such a capacity to direct sensual and emotional reactions that makes possible the donation of one to another, based on the mature possession of oneself…” John Paul II, Audiencia General, November 7, 1984: Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II, VII, 2 (1984), p. 1174-1175.
[16] “bonum opus est bene uti libidinis malo, quod faciunt coniugati, sicut e contrario malum opus est, male uti corporis bono, quod faciunt impudici” Contra Jul. opus imperf. 5, 12 (PL 45, 1143).
[17] If it is assumed – although this thesis is not free of difficulties – that only at a later moment did they consent to be husband and wife, the question is even clearer: copulation – the act of conjugal knowledge – when their consent to be husband and wife had not yet intervened, would not have made sense. en absoluto.
[18] “Numquid hoc non est peccatum, amplius quam liberorum procreandorum necessitas cogit, exigere a coniuge debitum? Est quidem peccatum, sed veniale” Sermo 51, c. 13, no. 22 (PL 38, 345); cf. De bono con. c. 6, no. 6 (PL 40, 378); De nupt. et conc. I, c. 14, no. 16 (PL 44, 423); Contra Jul. Pel. V, c. 16, no. 63 (PL 44, 819); Op. imperf. c. Jul. I, 68 (PL 45, 1091), etc. It should be noted that Saint Thomas Aquinas teaches the same thing: II-II, q. 154, art. 2 ad 6; Suppl. q. 49, art. 5; cf. q. 41, art. 4.
[19] cf. the author’s study, “The Inviolability of the Conjugal Act” in Creative Love (Findings of the San Francisco Conference on Human Reproduction: July 1987), Christendom Press, 1989, pp. 151-167; was also published, under the title “Marriage and Contraception”, in L’Osservatore Romano (English ed.) October 10, 1988, pp. 7-8.
[20] Saint Thomas indicates that the defect of marital copulation is not in the intensity of the pleasure that accompanies it (and that he defends), but in the fact that this pleasure does not follow the guidance of reason: Suppl., q. 49, art. 4 ad 3.
[21] “bona voluntas animi, sequentem ducit, non ducentem sequitur corporis voluptatem” De nupt. et conc. I, c. 12, no. 13 (PL 44, 421). It is worth noting here how Aquinas boldly highlights the Catholic attitude towards pleasure. It teaches that in the state of innocence the pleasure of marital copulation would have been even greater, as a consequence of the possession of a purer nature, endowed with a more sensitive body (Prima Pars, q. 98, art. 2 ad 3).
