This chapter is based mainly on Michel Grison, Teología Natural o Teodicea, pp. 27-134; I have also used Otto Muck, Doctrina filosófica de Dios, pp. 122-178, 197-227, and Béla Weissmahr, Teología natural, pp. 19-118 (see no. 16 for the bibliography consulted).
1. Natural theology
Philosophy is the knowledge of all things through their ultimate causes, acquired by reason. All aspects of reality can be the object of philosophical study, since in all of them the deepest and most radical explanations can be sought by applying reasoning to the data provided by experience. Each particular science, on the other hand, studies one concrete aspect of reality, leaving the others outside its consideration, and confines itself to the search for explanations within restricted fields.
Metaphysics is philosophy understood in its strictest sense, since it studies reality by seeking its ultimate causes in an absolute way; it asks about the innermost reality of all things, that is, about their being, studying which causes ultimately explain the being and the different modes of being of entities.
It is necessary to distinguish between the metaphysical approach, which is common to the other philosophical disciplines (cosmology, anthropology, ethics, logic, etc.), and the proper themes of metaphysics. The metaphysical approach consists in studying reality in the light of its ultimate causes. The proper themes of metaphysics include realities that do not depend on matter for their being. The parts of metaphysics are the following:
• Ontology, which deals with being as being and with the modes and structures of entities;
• Gnoseology, which studies the scope of metaphysical knowledge itself and its relationship to being;
• Natural theology, which is the highest part of metaphysics.
Natural theology is the science that studies God as Absolute Being and First Cause of entities insofar as He is accessible to natural reason. It is distinguished from supernatural theology, which begins from supernatural divine revelation.
Starting from the being of limited entities, human reason can arrive at knowledge of the existence of God, of some of His attributes and of some of His relations with the world and man. Since Leibnitz, natural theology has also been called “theodicy,” a poorly chosen name which etymologically means “justification of God.”
This brief introduction to natural theology is based mainly on Mariano Artigas, Introducción a la Filosofía, pp. 15-59; I have also consulted Jacques Maritain, Introducción a la Filosofía, pp. 81-89, 222-226 (see no. 16 – Bibliography consulted).
2. The existence of God is not self-evident
For this section, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 1.
A judgment is self-evident (per se notum) if it is necessarily true in every possible world (a per se judgment) and if, moreover, we can understand its truth merely by understanding its terms, without the need for demonstration. This occurs, for example, if the essence of the predicate is contained in the essence of the subject and if we also immediately understand the essences of both subject and predicate.
The proposition “God exists” is a per se judgment because the existence of God coincides with His essence. Nevertheless, that proposition is not self-evident (per se notum), because we do not know the essence of God. This is shown simply by the existence of sane persons who are atheists. Therefore we need to demonstrate the existence of God.
Nevertheless, despite what has been said so far, there exists in every human being an implicit knowledge of the existence of God: every human being knows the existence of truth, and God Himself is Truth; moreover, every human being knows the existence of the good, and God Himself is the Good.
However, this mode of knowledge is very different from explicit knowledge. It is possible for a man not to recognize God as Primordial Truth and Supreme Good.
Opposed to the doctrine of the need for a demonstration of the existence of God is ontologism, whose main representative was Malebranche (1638-1715). According to Malebranche, the human intellect sees God Himself and sees in Him all the ideas of the finite things it knows.
Contrary to ontologism, in our present condition we must form an idea of God from experience. This is possible because there is in man a natural light distinct from the uncreated light, of which it is a participation. “To diminish the perfection of creatures is to diminish the perfection of divine power” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, 69).
3. The existence of God is demonstrable
For this section, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 2.
To demonstrate a proposition is to establish its truth from already known premises.
There are at least two kinds of demonstrations: a priori demonstrations proceed from knowledge of the cause to knowledge of the effect; a posteriori demonstrations, by contrast, proceed from knowledge of the effect to knowledge of the cause.
Since God is uncaused Being, it is impossible to demonstrate His existence a priori. It is possible, however, to demonstrate it a posteriori, since we know by experience the effects of God’s creative work and can reason upward from those effects to their First Cause. This is so even though we do not know the divine essence positively, since, as will be seen later, we can know it analogically from its effects. Since those effects are finite and God is infinite, we cannot thereby attain a perfect knowledge of God, but we can demonstrate His existence.
The truth of the existence of God is not properly an article of faith, but a preamble to faith, which can be known by natural reason. Faith presupposes natural knowledge and perfects it. Nevertheless, a particular human being may know this truth only by faith (and by non-reflective knowledge).
Opposed to this doctrine of the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God is the philosophical current called “agnosticism,” whose main representative was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). According to Kant, the principle of causality is a form of pure reason destined to unify possible experience and cannot legitimately be applied outside that experience; therefore this principle would not allow us to reach God. Kant considers the existence of God a postulate of practical reason. This Kantian position depends on his gnoseology and must be refuted on that ground. Either reason can know only the “phenomenon” (the “thing in me”), not the “noumenon” (the “thing in itself”), and then it cannot know the truth of the real and should fall from idealism into skepticism; or the intellect is capable of knowing the absolute truth of the real throughout the whole field of being (the realist thesis). Kant’s critique also contains other elements that will be considered in due course (cf. section 11).
4. The ontological argument and its refutation
Besides a priori and a posteriori demonstrations, there are a simultaneo demonstrations, which relate ontologically simultaneous aspects of one and the same reality.
The a simultaneo demonstration called by Kant the “ontological proof” establishes a logical identification between the essence and the existence of God and from there affirms God’s existence. This argument was first proposed by Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) in the Proslogion and was later defended by Saint Bonaventure, Descartes, Leibnitz and Hegel, among others. On the other hand, the same argument was refuted by Saint Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 1) and by Kant.
Saint Anselm reasons as follows: God is the being than which nothing greater can be conceived. The being than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist only in the intellect, since in that case one could think of another being that also existed in reality, and then this second being would be greater than the first. Therefore the being than which nothing greater can be conceived exists both in the intellect and in reality.
Saint Thomas refutes this argument as follows: even supposing that, when thinking of God, man understands the word “God” to refer to the being than which nothing greater can be conceived, it does not necessarily follow that he thinks this being exists really, but only mentally. To argue that this being must also exist really is to beg the question (that is, to assume what would have to be demonstrated).
The ontological argument makes an illegitimate passage from the logical order to the ontological order, that is, from the mental existence of God to His real existence. From the idea of God’s essence one can arrive only at the idea of God’s existence, not at His existence itself. To arrive at the being of God we must begin from the being of things (the world and man).
The variants of the ontological proof adduced by Descartes and Leibnitz are very similar to Saint Anselm’s reasoning and can basically be refuted in the same way. These arguments are not conclusive because our knowledge of God’s essence is imperfect; our idea of God cannot equal its object.
A different argument consists in considering the idea of Absolute Being as a fact that must be explained. This argument resembles that of “universal consensus” (cf. section 14).
5. The five ways. Their general structure
The classical proofs of the existence of God are the “five ways” set forth by Saint Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274) in the Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3. They are a posteriori demonstrations, since they begin from experiential data (the existence of entities with properties that denote contingency). Kant called them “cosmological proofs,” although in reality they are metaphysical proofs, based on the metaphysical principle of causality: “Every contingent being has a cause.” A being is contingent if it is and can not be; by contrast, a being is necessary if it is and cannot not be.
The principle of causality depends on the principle of reason of being: “Everything that exists has its reason of being.” Every entity that does not have its reason of being in itself has it in another entity (its cause).
Although Thomas follows different lines of reasoning in his exposition of each of the five ways, they can be reduced to the following general structure:
First step: metaphysical analysis of the empirical datum
Syllogism 1:
• Major 1: Every entity that has property P is contingent.
• Minor 1: Entity S has property P.
• Conclusion 1: Entity S is contingent.
Major 1 will be demonstrated later for each of the ways.
Minor 1 is an empirical datum. Property P, which denotes contingency, is different in each of the five ways: motion, causal dependence, contingency, limited perfection, subjection to natural laws.
Second step: core of the proof
The core of the proof begins with the following pair of syllogisms:
Syllogism 2:
• Major 2: Every contingent entity has a cause.
• Minor 2: Entity S is contingent.
• Conclusion 2: Entity S has a cause (S’).
Syllogism 3:
• Major 3: Every entity is necessary or contingent.
• Minor 3: S’ (cause of S) is an entity.
• Conclusion 3: S’ is necessary or contingent.
Major 2 is the metaphysical principle of causality.
Minor 2 is Conclusion 1.
Major 3 is deduced from the logical principle of excluded middle.
Minor 3 is Conclusion 2 (reformulated).
Conclusion 3 offers two alternatives:
• If S’ is necessary, we have found the necessary being we were seeking.
• If S’ is contingent, there exists entity S” which is the cause of S’, and we must apply Syllogisms 2 and 3 again, changing S to S’ and S’ to S’’.
The final part of the core of the proof is the exclusion of an infinite regress:
If S’ is the cause of S and S’’ is the cause of S’, then S’’ is the cause of the cause of S. Without S’’, S’ could not be the cause of S.
It is not possible for the succession S’, S’’, S”’… of contingent causes to be infinite, because then, ultimately, none of them (nor the infinite set formed by all of them) could ground the reason of being of S. Regress to infinity indefinitely postpones the problem of what the reason of being of S is, but without solving it and, even more, making its solution impossible. Now, everything has a reason of being. The regress must stop at an entity D that is necessary and is the first term of the succession of causes of S (its “first cause”). This entity is called “God.”
Against the possibility of an infinite succession of causes, it can also be argued that, in such a succession, either there are repeated elements or there are no repeated elements. If there are, it is a circular chain composed of a finite number of entities. In this case each link of the chain would be the cause of itself, which is absurd. If there are no repeated elements, it is a linear chain composed of an infinite number of actual entities, which is absurd.
Third step: metaphysical analysis of Necessary Being
Syllogism 4:
• Major 4: Every necessary entity lacks property P.
• Minor 4: There exists entity D which is the first cause of S and is necessary.
• Conclusion 4: Entity D lacks property P.
Major 4 is demonstrated by reductio ad absurdum (demonstrations by absurdity are based on the logical principle of non-contradiction). Let us suppose that a necessary entity has property P. Then, by Syllogism 1, it follows that this entity is contingent (that is, not necessary), which contradicts the hypothesis.
Minor 4 is the conclusion reached in the core of the proof.
This analysis allows us to deduce one of the divine attributes. God is such that He does not admit property P, which denotes contingency.
Combining the five ways and their consequences, Saint Thomas’s global syllogism is the following: There exists a being who is First Mover, First Cause, Necessary Being, Most Perfect Being, Governor of the World, Simple, Immaterial, Personal, etc. Now, such a being is what we call “God.” Therefore, God exists.
Therefore, strictly speaking, the Thomistic proof of the existence of God does not end in the article on the five ways, since only after the deduction of the attributes of the First Cause can it be assured that that whose existence has been demonstrated is the very being we call “God.”
6. The first way
The first way is also called the proof from motion or from the efficient causes of becoming. It has antecedents in Aristotle.
The starting point of this way is the fact of motion: there are things that move. The motion considered here is not identified with physical motion, but is metaphysical motion (the passage from potency to act), which includes every kind of change, substantial or accidental.
In order to apply the reasoning set forth in section 5, it is necessary to prove that every entity that moves is contingent. This is so because a movable being is in potency with respect to the reality toward which it tends; it must receive it from a being that is in act with respect to that same reality. Therefore the movable being is contingent. By the principle of causality, the motion of the movable being requires an efficient cause (a mover): “whatever is moved is moved by another.” Saint Thomas demonstrates this statement as follows: to be moved is to pass from potency to act. Potency cannot give act to itself, because act is more than potency. From potency to act, then, nothing passes except by the work of a being in act. Therefore, the entity that is moved, as such, is in potency, and the mover, as such, is in act. Nothing can be in act and in potency at the same time in the same respect. Thus, one cannot be both mover and moved under the same respect. Therefore, whatever is moved is moved by another.
The reasoning followed by Saint Thomas in the first way is similar to that set forth in section 5. The mover that moves the movable being may be unmoved or moved. If it is unmoved, we have found the first (Uncaused) cause of the motion of the movable being. If it is moved, then it is moved by another mover, which may in turn be unmoved or moved. But it is impossible to go back to infinity in the succession of moved movers actually subordinated, because in an infinite succession all the movers would receive and transmit motion, but none of them (nor the set formed by all of them) could explain it. Consequently there must exist a first unmoved mover. This being, who is pure act, without any mixture of potency, is called “God.” This proof does not depend on an obsolete cosmology, because it is not situated on the scientific plane, but on the metaphysical plane.
The things of our world are mutable, temporal entities. They are contingent because their present being is not metaphysically necessary. Therefore the absolute Being who makes them possible is immutable and eternal. Because God is eternal, His action is exercised in the present instant in the change that occurs in it. The action of the first mover transcends the action of secondary movers. God does not change by His action; He is independent of the world that changes. Consequently, the study of God’s action does not belong to science, but to metaphysics.
7. The second way
The second way is also called the proof from causation or from the efficient causes of being. It has antecedents in Aristotle; later it was developed by Duns Scotus and Suárez.
The starting point of this way is the fact of causation: there are things that depend on actual efficient causes, both in their substantial being and in their accidental modes of being.
In order to apply the reasoning set forth in section 5, it is necessary to prove that every caused entity is contingent. This is so because the being of the caused entity depends on the being of its cause. Insofar as the latter may or may not be, the former may or may not be. Therefore, caused being is contingent.
The reasoning followed by Saint Thomas is similar to that set forth in section 5. The cause of the caused being may be Uncaused or caused. If it is Uncaused, we have found the first (Uncaused) cause of the caused being in question. If it is caused, then it is caused by another being that may in turn be uncaused or caused. But it is impossible to go back to infinity in the succession of caused causes actually subordinated, because in an infinite succession all the causes would receive and transmit being, but none of them (nor the set formed by all of them) could explain it. Consequently there must exist a First Cause Uncaused. This being, who is Being subsisting of itself, is called “God.”
The things of our world are caused entities. They are contingent because they need a cause. Therefore the absolute Being who makes them possible is the First Cause, the uncaused foundation of everything relative. God acts in the present upon all successions of causes in order to preserve the being of effects. He makes use of secondary causes and gives them their own activity, but He alone is the principal cause of existence. The first cause is transcendent and its activity is of the metaphysical order.
8. The third way
The third way is also called the proof from contingency or from the possible and the necessary. It has antecedents in Plato, Avicenna and Maimonides.
The starting point of this way is the fact of contingency: there are things that are contingent, that is, that are but can not be. Substantial and accidental changes are signs of contingency.
In this case the reasoning set forth in section 5 is applied directly. By the metaphysical principle of causality, every contingent entity has a cause, which gives it its reason of being. Contingent being is conditioned (relative) being, whereas necessary being is unconditioned (absolute).
The reasoning followed by Saint Thomas is similar to that set forth in section 5. The cause of the contingent being may be necessary or contingent. If it is necessary, we have demonstrated that there is something necessary in reality. If it is contingent, then it is caused by another being that may in turn be necessary or contingent. But it is impossible to go back to infinity in the succession of contingent causes, because in an infinite succession all the causes would receive and transmit being, but none of them (nor the set formed by all of them) could explain it. Consequently there must exist a necessary being. Saint Thomas does not exclude the theoretical possibility that caused necessary beings may exist. Therefore the reasoning continues as follows: The necessary being found may be necessary through itself or through another. If it is necessary through another, it is caused. By excluding an infinite regress, one concludes that there exists a being necessary through itself, which is called “God.”
The things of our world are contingent entities. Therefore the absolute Being who makes them possible is necessary; He does not merely possess being in a contingent degree. In created beings, existence is an effect, which belongs properly to the universal cause. God acts everywhere to produce and preserve contingent being; the smallest reality is a sign of His presence.
9. The fourth way
The fourth way is also called the proof from the degrees of perfection or from the degrees of being. It has antecedents in Plato, Plotinus, Saint Augustine and Saint Anselm; later it was developed by Leibnitz, Maréchal and Blondel.
The starting point of this way is the fact of the degrees of perfection: there are things with different degrees of perfection. Here the question concerns any of the simple perfections, that is, those which are not necessarily mixed with imperfections. Simple perfections are of two types: transcendental and personal.
The transcendental perfections are unity, truth, goodness and beauty. They result directly from the notion of being and therefore belong to every being. The personal perfections are intelligence, will, justice, mercy, etc. In themselves they imply no limitation.
In order to apply the reasoning set forth in section 5, it is necessary to prove that every entity of limited perfection is contingent. This is so because a perfection that exists of itself is unlimited, since it could not be the principle of its own limitation. Therefore, a being of limited perfection is dependent; it must have received its perfection from another (its cause).
A reasoning similar to that set forth in section 5 could be applied here: The cause of a being of limited perfection is a being of unlimited or limited perfection. If it is of unlimited perfection, we have found the first cause of the being of limited perfection. If it is of limited perfection, then it is caused by another being that may in turn be of unlimited or limited perfection. But it is impossible to go back to infinity in the succession of causes of limited perfection, because in an infinite succession all the causes would receive and transmit that perfection, but none of them (nor the set formed by all of them) could explain it. Consequently there must exist a being of unlimited perfection, who is called “God.”
The things of our world are ontologically finite entities, in development, capable of perfection. They are contingent because they do not possess all perfection. Therefore the absolute Being who makes them possible is infinite, absolutely perfect, not needing to acquire perfection. The infinite perfection of the first cause is finite in its effects, since it is limited by the capacity of the essences that receive it. There is a simple participation of creatures in divine perfection.
10. The fifth way
The fifth way is also called the proof from finality, from the order of the world, or from the government of the world. Kant called it the “physico-theological proof.” It has antecedents in Anaxagoras, Plato and the Stoics.
The starting point of this way is the fact of natural laws: there are non-intelligent beings that act for an end. Natural activities show a constancy in the pursuit of the good, which denotes an intentional finality.
Against this fact one could oppose the objection of natural disorders. This objection emphasizes that natural activities do not always bring about the good of beings, but “for the most part,” as Saint Thomas recognizes. The “disorder” of nature is in reality a limited order. Physical evil can find its place within this order.
In order to apply the reasoning set forth in section 5, it is necessary to prove that every entity subject to natural laws is contingent. This is so because a being lacking knowledge that acts in order to an end has not given itself its ordination to that end, but has received it from another being. An intentional order presupposes the action of an intelligence. Neither chance nor necessity can account for this order. Therefore the being subject to natural laws is dependent; it must have received its natural laws from another being (its cause), one that is intelligent.
A reasoning similar to that set forth in section 5 could be applied here. The cause of the being subject to natural laws is an intelligent being, which exists through itself or through another. If it exists through itself, we have found the first cause of the order of the world. If it does not exist through itself, then it is caused by another intelligent being which in turn may exist through itself or through another. But it is impossible to go back to infinity in the succession of ordering intelligences that do not exist through themselves, because in an infinite succession all these intelligences would receive and transmit the natural order, but none of them (nor the set formed by all of them) could explain it. Consequently there must exist an ordering intelligence that exists through itself, which is called “God.”
The things of our world are entities that operate according to a natural law. They are contingent because their finite ontological content obliges them to a determined action. Therefore the absolute Being who makes them possible creates freely; He does not rest externally upon a determined action.
This way, developed here from the efficient cause, can also be developed from the final cause. Within the framework of the fifth way, arguments based on scientific-natural knowledge concerning the order and evolution of the cosmos and living beings can find an adequate foundation. For example: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, in El fenómeno humano, develops a very suggestive argument from scientific data presented with great expressive force, but with poor metaphysical grounding.
11. The criticisms of the classical proofs
Since the classical proofs of the existence of God depend on the metaphysical principle of causality, criticisms of them have concentrated mainly on that principle.
According to empiricism, whose main representative was David Hume (1711-1776), the idea of a connection between cause and effect results from a simple habit. The repeated observation of one object followed by another produces in us the notion of a link between them, so that the appearance of the first object always makes us think of the second. This doctrine of Hume depends on his theory of knowledge, according to which the whole creative power of the mind is reduced to combining, transposing, increasing or diminishing the materials provided by the senses and experience. By denying the intellect, empiricism ends in true skepticism.
Kant’s idealism, reacting against Hume’s empiricism, strives to restore the value of the concept of causality. According to Kant, the notions of cause and effect are not derived from experience but arise from pure reason. The principle of causality thus becomes a subjective principle, destined to unify possible experience, but without value beyond it.
According to Thomistic theory, the principle of causality has an ontological value and a transcendental value. Its ontological value is guaranteed by the theory of abstraction: in experience itself the intellect discovers universal being and the first principles, abstracting ideas from perceived objects. Its transcendental value is guaranteed by the theory of analogy: the concepts of being, cause and end are applied analogically to all the different beings, even to God.
Kant’s other great objection to the cosmological proofs of the existence of God consists in saying that these proofs are reduced to the ontological proof, which can be refuted. However, this is not so. In the cosmological proofs one passes from the existence of contingent beings to the existence of necessary being and from there to the existence of the most perfect being. The whole reasoning remains on the existential plane. In the ontological proof, by contrast, one passes from the idea of the most perfect being to the idea of necessary being, from this to the existence of necessary being (this is the illegitimate step), and from there to the existence of the most perfect being. Only the last step is the same in both arguments.
12. The arguments founded on the moral order
Kant calls “ethico-theological proofs” the proofs of the existence of God founded on the moral order. After the anthropocentric turn represented by Kant’s work in the history of philosophy, many philosophers have come to give more importance to this kind of argument than to the cosmological proofs. For example, for John Henry Newman (1801-1890), the most important proof of the existence of God is the one that begins from the fact of conscience. Nevertheless, for Kant himself the existence of God was a postulate of practical reason, that is, a supposition without rational foundation that was convenient for him in order to ground his moral philosophy. A postulate of this kind is, in the end, nothing but an arbitrary option, as justified as the contrary option.
I shall briefly set forth two arguments founded on the moral order, one based on moral obligation and the other on moral sanction.
Man feels absolutely obliged to do good and avoid evil. An absolute obligation implies the tendency of the will toward an absolute good. This tendency does not come from man’s free choice but from a natural necessity. Now, that natural necessity comes from the Creator of our nature. God Himself is the absolute good and, if He creates spiritual beings, He necessarily obliges them to tend toward Himself. He is the foundation of moral obligation.
The man who fulfills his moral duty must attain happiness. The demand for a just sanction is also absolute. We cannot accept that our destiny should finally be handed over to natural contingencies or to an arbitrary external will. The existence of God is the only possible guarantee of a just moral sanction.
According to Thomistic philosophy, moral arguments, strictly speaking, are not conclusive, because they begin from facts of experience that can be denied and that would have to be justified further.
According to the philosophical-transcendental approach, followed among others by J. Maréchal, J. B. Lotz and Karl Rahner (1904-1984), moral arguments have as much value as cosmological ones, insofar as all of them are diverse developments of the “transcendental experience,” the only way of access to the knowledge of God.
13. The testimony of the mystics
According to Henri Bergson, mysticism is the principal fact which, coinciding with other conclusions of experience, makes it possible to attain knowledge of God. God is experienced in an intuition whose privileged subjects are the mystics. Mystical love reaches to the very root of reality. Nevertheless, Bergson recognizes that mystical experience, left to itself, cannot give the philosopher definitive certainty of the existence of God.
It is a fact that some privileged souls declare to us that they have experienced the presence of God, not simply by inference, but through a kind of obscure perception.
According to Thomistic thought, this testimony can corroborate our adherence to the existence of God, but it has value only by reference to faith, not as an argument of reason. The person who does not believe will seek natural explanations for the experiences of the mystics.
According to the philosophical-transcendental approach, the mystical experiences alluded to here are nothing but particular cases of transcendental experience, which is in a certain sense an experience of God (indirect, implicit and athematic), given in man always and everywhere.
These two philosophical currents agree that, in order to give reason for our affirmation of the existence of God, we do not have to resort to special investigations of advanced science or to strange experiences. It is wholly enough for us to develop methodically the references to God contained in everyday experience, accessible to all men.
14. Universal consensus
The demonstration of the existence of God called the proof from universal consensus or from the consensus of peoples is found, for example, in the work of Cicero.
It could be formulated as follows: The starting point of the proof is the fact that the great majority of humanity, throughout history and across the world, has practiced or practices a religion. According to the principle of finality, every agent acts for an end. From this it can be deduced that a natural desire of a rational being cannot be vain. Applying this principle to the stated fact, it follows that natural religion cannot be vain. From this the existence of the divinity is concluded.
According to Thomistic philosophy, this argument has only a value of probability, for the following reasons: The fact taken as the starting point is not evident. Present humanity includes a considerable percentage of atheistic persons. Moreover, it is not easy to determine the common content of the hypothetical universal consensus. On the other hand, it is not evident either that the religious consensus of peoples allows us to speak of a natural desire for God. One could doubt whether it is a natural desire or whether its object is the one God of monotheism. It could be maintained that there exists a natural desire for transcendence, that is, for a form of existence that goes beyond the temporal and beyond death, for a certain reality that exists beyond the conditioned and limited character of this life.
Thomistic analysis is based on the need of every intelligent entity to know the cause of things. This leads the human intellect to desire knowledge of the First Cause. And since perfect knowledge is intuitive, Saint Thomas even affirms that this natural desire has as its object the beatific vision, which is supernatural. It is, however, an inefficacious and conditioned, hypothetical desire, the Thomists say, in order to safeguard the gratuity of ordination to the supernatural end, which is not demanded by human nature.
Nevertheless, the “consensus of peoples” is a very important indication. The different convictions of human beings concerning the religious question, insofar as they have a natural origin, can be explained as more or less accurate reflective developments of the experience of the conditioned (inferring the existence of the unconditioned by way of causality, according to Thomism) or else of the non-conceptual experience of the unconditioned (which is the condition of possibility of the experience of the conditioned, according to the philosophical-transcendental approach).
15. The philosophical-transcendental foundation
For this section, cf. Karl Rahner, Experiencia del Espíritu (see the bibliography).
Within the philosophical-transcendental current, the cosmological form of the classical proofs of the existence of God is transformed into a form that begins from man. The existence of God is presented here as the condition that makes conscious and free human life possible. In this way it seeks to achieve greater independence from images of the world conditioned by the scientific knowledge of the moment and to highlight the importance of God as the foundation that makes human existence possible and gives it meaning. According to this position, one must distinguish between the athematic experience of this divine foundation and its explicit conceptual development.
This current of thought does not coincide with ontologism, since it maintains that there is no direct and explicit experience of God in the manner of the perception of a particular object. Nevertheless, at the same time it maintains that the experience of the unconditioned, which occurs in the athematic experience of being, truth, value, self-consciousness, freedom, etc., is in a certain sense an experience of God. Explicit knowledge of the existence and essence of God would then be nothing more and nothing less than the conceptual development of this transcendental experience. This explicit knowledge of God, by the very nature of the matter, would depend on a personal decision that cannot be forced.
Transcendental experience can be grasped reflectively in a broad set of fundamental facts. By way of example, I shall indicate here the methodical development of the reference to God contained in one of those facts, that of man in search of the meaning of life.
Human action is not possible without an apprehension of meaning. Properly speaking, only that which points beyond itself has meaning. Man’s particular actions have meaning only when his life as a whole also has meaning. The meaning of the whole of life needs no further foundation; it is something unconditional. We are deeply convinced of the existence of a meaning of life. A radical orientation toward something cannot lack an object. Insofar as a man, in each of his acts, supposes and affirms an absolute meaning of his life, he recognizes an ultimate reality that religious language calls “God.”
The Thomistic critique of this position includes the following fundamental points:
• It does not seem that there can exist an “athematic experience” or an “athematic experience of being,” in the sense given to these terms by the philosophical-transcendental current.
• There cannot exist a natural experience of God on the part of a finite entity.
• Not all knowledge of God depends on a personal decision. The proofs of the existence of God, as such, have an intrinsic validity that does not depend on a personal decision. What depends on a personal decision is the acceptance of the proofs.
16. Bibliography consulted
• Artigas, Mariano – Introducción a la Filosofía, Libros de Iniciación Filosófica 7, EUNSA, Pamplona 1990.
• Grison, Michel – Teología Natural o Teodicea, Curso de Filosofía Tomista 6, Editorial Herder, Barcelona 1985.
• Maritain, Jacques – Introducción a la Filosofía, Club de Lectores, Buenos Aires 1985.
• Muck, Otto – Doctrina filosófica de Dios, Biblioteca de teología 6, Editorial Herder, Barcelona 1986.
• Rahner, Karl – Experiencia del Espíritu, Narcea, S.A. de Ediciones, Madrid 1978.
• Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre – El fenómeno humano, Historia del pensamiento 14, Ediciones Orbis, Barcelona 1984.
• Thomas Aquinas, Saint – Summa Theologiae, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 1955.
• Weissmahr, Béla – Teología natural, Curso Fundamental de Filosofía 5, Editorial Herder, Barcelona 1986.
Reasons for Our Hope. Writings of Catholic Apologetics, Centro Cultural Católico “Fe y Razón”, Montevideo 2009, Chapter 1
Author: Daniel Iglesias Grèzes
Source: blog at Infocatolica.com
